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October 4, 2018: FinCEN warns of Nicaraguan corruption proceeds

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FinCEN Advisory Warns of Risks Linked to Corruption in Nicaragua 

Contact
Steve Hudak 703-905-3770
Immediate Release
October 04, 2018

WASHINGTON—The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an advisory today to alert U.S. financial institutions of the increasing risk that proceeds of political corruption from Nicaragua may enter or traverse the U.S. financial system. FinCEN expects that senior foreign political figures connected to the regime of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega could react to the perceived threat of further unrest, potential sanctions, or other factors by moving assets out of their accounts in Nicaragua or elsewhere. These assets could be the proceeds of corruption, and they may be directed into U.S. accounts, or laundered through the U.S. financial system. FinCEN requests that financial institutions file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), consistent with their existing Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations, when they identify potential misuse of Nicaraguan public funds or potential proceeds of political corruption associated with senior foreign political figures connected to the Ortega regime.

“For years, Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega and his government have held fraudulent elections, suppressed civil society and independent media, and stolen money from government funds. The violence that Ortega’s regime has perpetrated against the Nicaraguan people is despicable, and the international financial community must be on guard to prevent exploitation by corrupt regime insiders,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “FinCEN’s advisory is part of this Administration’s ongoing campaign to hold individuals who engage in human rights abuses and corruption in Nicaragua to account.”

“The Ortega regime in Nicaragua is oppressive and corrupt, and it has illicitly enriched its membership and associates by stealing and depriving Nicaraguan citizens of resources and money that belongs to them. At the same time, this regime is perpetrating human rights abuses in response to citizen protests,” said FinCEN Director Kenneth A. Blanco. “Given the oppressive and corrupt conduct of the Ortega regime, and resulting unrest in Nicaragua, people and companies associated with or linked to the Ortega regime may try to move corruption-related assets out of Nicaragua. U.S. financial institutions are an important line of defense against corrupt and bloodstained money flowing through our system, and we are advising our partners in the financial sector to be on high alert.”

Today’s advisory is underscored by the actions Treasury has taken against Nicaraguan officials involved in corruption and human rights abuse. To date, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated four senior officials—within the Nicaraguan government, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, and ALBA de Nicaragua (ALBANISA), the company that imports and sells Venezuelan petroleum products—under the Global Magnitsky authority, which enables Treasury to target corrupt officials, human rights abusers, and their facilitators around the world. In doing so, OFAC has highlighted these officials’ roles in corrupt and violent acts, which include involvement in human rights abuses, illicitly amassing sizeable personal wealth, stealing large sums of money from municipal projects, and exploiting government funds for the personal use of Nicaraguan leaders.

FinCEN previously published a June 2018 “Advisory on Human Rights Abuses Enabled by Corrupt Senior Foreign Political Figures and Their Financial Facilitators” in which it identified typologies and red flags illustrating how corrupt senior foreign political figures and their facilitators access the U.S. financial system to obscure and launder the proceeds of high-level political corruption. Financial institutions may reference today’s advisory together with the June 2018 advisory.

This advisory does not address transactions of ordinary Nicaraguan citizens, who may also seek to move assets out of the country due to the current political unrest. This advisory is not intended to affect normal financial relationships between the United States and Nicaragua.

The advisory also reminds financial institutions of their obligations regarding the filing of SARs related to facilitators of corrupt senior foreign political officials. FinCEN requests that financial institutions reference this advisory by including the key term “Nicaragua FIN-2018-A005” in the SAR narrative and in appropriate SAR fields to indicate a connection between the suspicious activity being reported and the persons and activities highlighted in the advisory.  

Links:

FinCEN Press Release

FinCEN Advisory


Short Notice: Sanctions & Anti-Corruption & Bribery seminar in Tasmania next Wednesday

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UNCLASSIFIED

 

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, together with the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry invite you to a seminar on Anti-Bribery and Corruption (ABC) for Business.

Corruption is a global phenomenon which presents a particularly significant risk to businesses operating in developing countries. This seminar will explore:

·         Developments in Australian anti-corruption legislation and the extra-territorial reach of Australian laws and cooperation with international partners

·         How DFAT can help business minimise and manage corruption issues and risks overseas

·         Practical guidance and tips on how to protect yourself, your business and your employee interests

 

Presented by Tamsin Bendeler-Cartledge, lawyer with the Transnational Crime Section at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 

Australian sanctions laws implement United Nations Security Council sanctions regimes and Australian autonomous sanctions regimes. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade administers Australia’s sanctions regimes.

Jack Williams, a member of DFAT’s Sanctions team, will be providing an overview of Australia’s sanctions laws, including the process for applying for sanctions permits.


Date

Time

City

Venue

Wednesday 28 November

10:30am-12:00pm

Hobart

 TCCI
 309 Liverpool Street
 Hobart
 *Please note – only street parking available


This a free presentation which would be highly valuable to businesses operating in the international trade and inward and outward investment areas. 

Register now! 

To register or for any enquiries please email dfat.tasmania@dfat.gov.au or call 6238 4098.

 

 

Sanctions Section

_______________________________
Transnational and Sea Law Branch
Legal Division

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Phone +61 2 6261 3830
www.dfat.gov.au | DFAT Sanctions website | DFAT Consolidated List

Web | Twitter | YouTube | Flickr

 

 

December 10, 2018: Former President of The Gambia barred from US due to corruption

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Public Designation of The Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

December 10, 2018


The Department is publicly designating former president of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, under the terms of Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2018, due to his involvement in significant corruption. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign government officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The law requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their immediate family members. In addition to the designation of Yahya Jammeh, the Department is also publicly designating Jammeh’s spouse, Zineb Yahya Jammeh, his daughter, Mariam Jammeh, and his son, Muhammad Yahya Jammeh.

The United States is committed to combating corruption, increasing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and promoting good governance globally. The United States stands with the government of The Gambia, its people, and civil society in support of The Gambia’s transition towards greater transparency, accountability, and democratic governance, for the benefit of all Gambians.

For more information, please contact

Link:

State Department Notice

December 12, 2018: Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council President gets US travel ban

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Public Designation, Due to Significant Corruption, of Nicaragua’s Roberto Jose Rivas Reyes

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

December 12, 2018


Due to his involvement in significant corruption, the Department is publicly designating the President of Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council, Roberto Jose Rivas Reyes, under the terms of Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2018. Rivas was designated in December 2017 under Executive Order 13818 implementing the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for involvement in significant corruption and for perpetuating electoral fraud that undermined Nicaragua’s electoral institutions. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their immediate family members. In addition to the designation of Mr. Rivas, the Secretary is also publicly designating Mr. Rivas’ spouse, Ileana Patricia Lacayo Delgado de Rivas.

For more information, please contact INL-PAPD@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Notice

December 19, 2018: Section 7031(c) designation for Goran Radosavljevic

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Public Designation of Goran Radosavljevic Under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

December 18, 2018


The Department is publicly designating Goran Radosavljevic of Serbia under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States. Radsosavljevic was credibly implicated in the 1999 murder of the Bytyqi brothers, three Albanian-American brothers killed in Serbia after the Kosovo War.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their family members. In addition to the designation of Mr. Radosavljevic, the Department is also publicly designating Mr. Radosavljevic’s spouse, Svetlana Radosavljevic, and his daughter, Ana Radosavljevic.

For more information, please contact DRL-Press@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Press Release

Multiple State Department corruption/human rights abuse designations for DRC officials

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Public Designation of, and Visa Restrictions Placed on, Multiple Officials of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption, Human Rights Violations or Abuses, or Undermining of Democracy

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

February 22, 2019


The United States stands with the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) following that country’s historic transfer of power. The elections reflect the desire of the people of the D.R.C. for change and accountable government institutions. However, there are legitimate concerns over the conduct and transparency of the electoral process.

The Secretary of State is publicly designating, due to their involvement in significant corruption relating to the electoral process, the following individuals: Mr. Corneille Nangaa, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (D.R.C.) National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI); Mr. Norbert Basengezi Katintima, Vice President of CENI; Mr. Marcellin Mukolo Basengezi, Advisor to the President of CENI; Mr. Aubin Minaku Ndjalandjoko, President of the D.R.C.’s National Assembly; and Mr. Benoit Lwamba Bindu, President of the D.R.C.’s Constitutional Court. This public designation is being made under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2019, (Div. F, P.L. 116-6-).

Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that officials of foreign governments have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The Secretary of State is also imposing visa restrictions on election officials as well as military and government officials believed to be responsible for, complicit in, or to have engaged in human rights violations or abuses or undermining of the democratic process in the D.R.C.

These individuals enriched themselves through corruption, or directed or oversaw violence against people exercising their rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. They operated with impunity at the expense of the Congolese people and showed a blatant disregard for democratic principles and human rights.

The Department of State emphasizes that the actions announced today are specific to certain officials and not directed at the Congolese people or the newly elected government. This decision reflects the Department of State’s commitment to working with the new D.R.C. government to realize its expressed commitment to end corruption and strengthen democracy and accountability, and respect for human rights.

For more information, please contact AF-Press@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Press Release

April 25, 2019: Muslim Khuchiev designated by State Department for human rights violations

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Public Designation, Due to Gross Violations of Human Rights, of Muslim Khuchiev, the Chairman of the Government of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

April 25, 2019


The Department is publicly designating Muslim Khuchiev, the Chairman (Prime Minister) of the Government of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act, due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States. The Department has credible information that Muslim Khuchiev was involved in torture.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their immediate family members. In addition to the designation of Muslim Khuchiev, the Department is also publicly designating his spouse, Sapiyat Shabazova.

We note that a recent report produced under the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism concluded that Chechen government officials have committed serious and ongoing human rights violations and abuses with impunity, engaging in “harassment and persecution, arbitrary or unlawful arrests or detentions, torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions.” We again call on Russian Federal authorities to hold those officials responsible for human rights violations in Chechnya to account, including Muslim Khuchiev.

For more information, please contact

Link:

State Department Press Release

May 9, 2019: FinCEN reissues Venezuelan corruption advisory in the native tongue…

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FinCEN Issues Spanish Language Version of Advisory FIN-2019-A002, Warning Against Continued Corrupt Venezuelan Attempts to Steal, Hide, or Launder Money 

 

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) today made available in Spanish its advisory (FIN-2019-A002), which warns against continued corrupt Venezuelan attempts to steal, hide, or launder money. The advisory was issued in English on May 3, 2019. FinCEN is issuing this Spanish language version to make it more widely accessible.

 

News Release (Spanish):  https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/aviso-actualizado-de-fincen-advierte-contra-los-continuos-intentos-corruptos-de

Advisory (Spanish):  https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2019-a002-spanish

 

News Release (English):  https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/updated-fincen-advisory-warns-against-continued-corrupt-venezuelan-attempts

Advisory (English):  https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2019-a002

 

———-

 

FinCEN publica versión en español del aviso FIN-2019-A002, que advierte sobre los intentos continuos y corruptos de Venezuela de robar, ocultar o lavar dinero  

 

La Red Contra los Delitos Financieros (FinCEN, por sus siglas en inglés) publicó en español hoy su aviso (FIN-2019-A002), para alertar a las instituciones financieras sobre la continua corrupción pública generalizada en Venezuela y advertir contra los continuos intentos corruptos de robar, esconder o lavar dinero. El aviso se emitió en inglés el 3 de mayo de 2019. FinCEN está emitiendo esta versión en español para que sea más accesible.

 

Comunicado de Prensa: https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/aviso-actualizado-de-fincen-advierte-contra-los-continuos-intentos-corruptos-de 

Aviso: https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2019-a002-spanish

 


Malawi Official designated under State Department corruption program

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The Secretary of State is publicly designating Mr. Uladi Basikolo Mussa, the current Malawian Special Advisor on Parliamentary Affairs and former Malawian Minister of Home Affairs, due to his involvement in significant corruption. Mr. Mussa engaged in and benefited from public corruption in relation to his official duties while Minister of Home Affairs. This designation is made under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act of 2019. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or gross violations of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their family members. In addition to the designation of Mr. Mussa, the Secretary is also publicly designating Mr. Mussa’s spouse, Cecillia Mussa.

For more information, please contact INL-PAPD@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Notice

July 16, 2019: State Department designates Burmese military officials for human rights violations

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Today, the Department of State is publicly designating the following individuals and their immediate family members for the named individuals’ responsibility for gross human rights violations, including in extrajudicial killings in northern Rakhine State, Burma, during the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya:

  • Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing

  • Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win

  • Brigadier General Than Oo

  • Brigadier General Aung Aung

These designations are made under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where there is credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.  The law also requires me to publicly or privately designate such officials and their family members.

The Department of State is focused on policies that will change behavior and promote accountability.  We believe this action is one step toward achieving these goals.

With this announcement, the United States is the first government to publicly take action with respect to the most senior leadership of the Burmese military.  We designated these individuals based on credible information of these commanders’ involvement in gross violations of human rights.

We remain concerned that the Burmese government has taken no actions to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, and there are continued reports of the Burmese military committing human rights violations and abuses throughout the country.

One egregious example of the continued and severe lack of accountability for the military and its senior leadership was the recent disclosure that Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing ordered the release of the soldiers convicted of the extrajudicial killings at Inn Din during the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya.  The Commander-in-Chief released these criminals after only months in prison, while the journalists who told the world about the killings in Inn Din were jailed for more than 500 days.

Link:

State Department Press Release

State Department Background Call

July 25, 2019: A raft of new Venezuela designations from OFAC

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Yesterday, OFAC added the following people:

 

GAVIDIA FLORES, Walter Jacob (a.k.a. GAVIDIA-FLORES, Walter), Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 15 Dec 1978; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 14407259 (Venezuela); Passport 113561269 (Venezuela) expires 28 Jan 2020 (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

GAVIDIA FLORES, Yosser Daniel (a.k.a. GAVIDIA-FLORES, Yosser), Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 11 Oct 1988; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 18815328 (Venezuela); Passport 135713284 (Venezuela) expires 31 May 2021 (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

GAVIDIA FLORES, Yoswal Alexander, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 06 Aug 1990; citizen Venezuela; Gender Male; Cedula No. 19733466 (Venezuela); Passport 134559177 (Venezuela) expires 11 May 2021 (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

PULIDO VARGAS, Alvaro Enrique (a.k.a. PULIDO VARGAS, Alvaro (Latin: PULIDO VARGAS, Álvaro); a.k.a. RUBIO SALAS, German Enrique); DOB 10 Dec 1963; citizen Colombia; Gender Male; Cedula No. 79324956 (Colombia) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique (a.k.a. RUBIO-GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique); DOB 06 Jan 1989; POB Bogota, Colombia; nationality Colombia; Gender Male; Cedula No. 21807689; Passport AM807340 (Colombia); alt. Passport PE139553 (Colombia); alt. Passport 087105100 (Venezuela); National ID No. 1015410162 (Colombia) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PULIDO VARGAS, Alvaro Enrique). 

 

SAAB CERTAIN, Isham Ali; DOB 14 Apr 1999; POB Barranquilla, Colombia; citizen Colombia; Gender Male; Passport AS005095 (Colombia); National ID No. 99041408126 (Colombia) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

SAAB CERTAIN, Shadi Nain (a.k.a. SAAB, Shadi; a.k.a. SAAB, Shadi Nain); DOB 25 Apr 1996; POB Barranquilla, Colombia; citizen Colombia; Gender Male; Passport PE097209 (Colombia); National ID No. 1045738303 (Colombia) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain (a.k.a. SAAB MORAN, Alex (Latin: SAAB MORÁN, Alex); a.k.a. SAAB, Alex); DOB 21 Dec 1971; Gender Male; Cedula No. 72180017 (Colombia); Passport PE085897 (Colombia); alt. Passport 085635076(Venezuela); alt. Passport D010302 (Antigua and Barbuda) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

STAUDINGER LEMOINE, Mariana Andrea, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 23 Apr 1990; citizen Venezuela; Gender Female; Cedula No. 19195336 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: GAVIDIA FLORES, Yosser Daniel). 

 

VIELMA MORA, Jose Gregorio, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 26 Oct 1964; Gender Male; Cedula No. 6206038 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA]. 

 

and entities:

ASASI FOOD FZE (a.k.a. ASASI FOODS FZC), Rakeem Building, Ras Al Khaimah Economic Zone, Ras-Al-Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 40803, Ras-Al-Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 0843-01732, Panama [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

C I FONDO GLOBAL DE ALIMENTOS LTDA, Calle 128 B 78 90, Bogota, D.C. 1103, Colombia; NIT # 9002234401(Colombia) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

CLIO MANAGEMENT CORP., Panama; Folio Mercantil No. 724213 (Panama) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PULIDO VARGAS, Alvaro Enrique). 

 

EMMR & CIA. S.A.S. (a.k.a. EMMR AND CIA. S.A.S.; a.k.a. EMMR Y CIA. S.A.S.; a.k.a. EMMR Y COMPANIA S A S), Calle 79 42 318, Barranquilla, Atlantico, Colombia; NIT # 9005964804 (Colombia) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

GLOBAL STRUCTURE, S.A., Panama City, Panama; Folio Mercantil No. 844394 (Panama) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

GROUP GRAND LIMITED (a.k.a. GROUP GRAND LIMITED GENERAL TRADING; a.k.a. GROUP GRAND LTD.), Room C, 25/F Cheuk Nang Plaza, 250 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong; Registration Number 1871367 (Hong Kong) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

GROUP GRAND LIMITED GENERAL TRADING, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

GROUP GRAND LIMITED, S.A. DE C.V. (a.k.a. GROUP GRAND LIMITED), Mexico City, Mexico; Folio Mercantil No. N-2017034206 (Mexico) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

MULBERRY PROJE YATIRIM ANONIM SIRKETI (a.k.a. MULBERRY PROJE YATIRIM; a.k.a. MULBERRY PROJE YATIRIM A.S.), Istanbul, Turkey; Cihannuma Mah. Dortyuzlucesme Sk. Gunes, Apt. 2/6, Besiktas, Istanbul, Turkey [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

MULTITEX INTERNATIONAL TRADING, S.A., Panama City, Panama; Folio Mercantil No. 844396 (Panama) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

SEAFIRE FOUNDATION, Panama City, Panama; Identification Number 56437 (Panama) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: SAAB MORAN, Alex Nain). 

 

SILVER BAY PARTNERS FZE, Manara Industrial Zone, Ras Al Khaimah Economic Zone, Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; Flexi Office, Business Center, Rakez Business Zone, Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates [VENEZUELA-EO13850]. 

 

SUN PROPERTIES LLC, DE, United States; 801 South Miami Ave, Unit PH5803, Miami, FL, United States; File Number 6096108 (United States) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: RUBIO GONZALEZ, Emmanuel Enrique). 

 

to their Venezuela sanctions program.

And the Treasury Department:

Treasury Disrupts Corruption Network Stealing From Venezuela’s Food Distribution Program, CLAP 

Alex Saab bribed stepsons of Nicolás Maduro and exploited no-bid contracts to
loot hundreds of millions of dollars from starving Venezuelans

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Colombian national Alex Nain Saab Moran (Saab), a profiteer orchestrating a vast corruption network that has enabled former President Nicolás Maduro (Maduro) and his regime to significantly profit from food imports and distribution in Venezuela.  Saab has personally profited from overvalued contracts, including the Government’s food subsidy program titled the Local Committees for Supply and Production, or Los Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción, commonly known as CLAP.  Through a sophisticated network of shell companies, business partners, and family members, Saab laundered hundreds of millions of dollars in corruption proceeds around the world.  Also targeted today are Maduro’s three stepsons, Walter, Yosser, and Yoswal, to whom Saab funneled money in exchange for access to contracts with the Government of Venezuela, including its food subsidy program.  

“Alex Saab engaged with Maduro insiders to run a wide scale corruption network they callously used to exploit Venezuela’s starving population.  Treasury is targeting those behind Maduro’s sophisticated corruption schemes, as well as the global network of shell companies that profit from the former regime’s military-controlled food distribution program,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  “The corruption network that operates the CLAP program has allowed Maduro and his family members to steal from the Venezuelan people.  They use food as a form of social control, to reward political supporters and punish opponents, all the while pocketing hundreds of millions of dollars through a number of fraudulent schemes.”

THE START OF A CORRUPT RELATIONSHIP

Since as early as 2009, Saab exploited his corrupt ties to Maduro regime insiders, frequently paying bribes and kickbacks to Government of Venezuela officials, to win overvalued government contracts.  Saab and his business partner, Alvaro Enrique Pulido Vargas (Pulido), created a company in 2009 to bid on a Government of Venezuela housing contract.  After a year of lobbying, the Government of Venezuela awarded a housing contract to Saab and Pulido’s company to build 25,000 homes in Venezuela; the contract paid Saab and Pulido three to four times the actual cost of building each low-income home, which were intended for Venezuela’s more vulnerable populations.

SAAB MEETS “LOS CHAMOS”

In 2011, Saab gave Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro’s (Flores) three sons Walter, Yosser, and Yoswal (also known as “Los Chamos”) and their cousin, Carlos Erica Malpica Flores (Malpica), a contract to clear land for the construction of homes in the Venezuelan State of Vargas.  Flores was designated on September 25, 2018 pursuant to E.O. 13692, as amended, for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela; Malpica was designated on July 26, 2017 pursuant to E.O. 13692, as amended, for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela.  Saab’s relationship with Flores, Los Chamos, and Malpica was key for Saab and Pulido’s access to Government of Venezuela officials, allowing them to pay the requisite bribes and kickbacks to obtain government contracts.  Los Chamos would also receive kickbacks from Saab’s companies in return for government contracts.  Los Chamos had frequent access to Maduro and Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah (El Aissami), who was designated on February 13, 2017 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking; El Aissami is the current Minister of Industries and National Production and former Executive Vice President of Venezuela.  As a result, Los Chamos were able to manipulate the recipients of government contracts, and Saab had the opportunity to work with the highest levels of the Venezuelan government. 

PROFITING FROM STARVATION

The former Maduro regime created the CLAP program in 2016 for the stated purpose of providing subsidized food ration boxes to poor Venezuelans.  Rather than ensure that this vulnerable population receives the food it desperately needs, the regime uses the CLAP program as a political tool to reward support and punish political criticism.  By offering food through this program, the former regime is able to maintain its influence because many Venezuelan citizens do not have enough money to buy food and therefore depend on the rations CLAP provides to survive.

Saab’s involvement with the CLAP program started in 2016 when he and Pulido devised a corporate structure to acquire the food from a foreign distributor, assemble it in a foreign country, and ship it to Venezuela, all at the most profitable rate for themselves.  Under Maduro’s watch, Saab reaped substantial profits and imported only a fraction of the food needed for the CLAP program. 

Once the food was purchased, Saab and Pulido aggregated the food at processing plants and assembled it for shipping.  Saab and Pulido used businesses in Mexico, relying on companies they already controlled, such as Group Grand Limited (which is headquartered in Hong Kong and also registered in Mexico in order to operate in the food industry).  In Mexico, Group Grand Limited, S.A. de C.V. is owned or controlled by Pulido’s son, Emmanuel Enrique Rubio Gonzalez.)  To maximize profits, Saab sought to use a Venezuelan state owned company located in the state of Táchira, Venezuela, which was exempt from import taxes. 

Saab used some of his profits from corrupt food contracts to pay bribes to government officials for the importation of food through the State of Táchira, including to Jose Gregorio Vielma Mora (Vielma Mora), who was the Governor of the Venezuelan State of Táchira at the time, and to Rodolfo Clemente Marco Torres (Marco Torres), who was the Minister of Food in Venezuela.  Marco Torres was designated on January 5, 2018 pursuant to E.O. 13692, as amended, for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela.  Vielma Mora and Marco Torres helped Saab and Pulido obtain winning bids for CLAP food contracts.  Saab also continued to provide kickbacks to Los Chamos from the profits of the CLAP program to maintain access to Government of Venezuela officials and continue to win lucrative government contracts.

Several companies Saab and Pulido own or control were used in Saab and Pulido’s food corruption scheme, including Asasi Food FZE, Mulberry Proje Yatirim Anonim Sirketi (Mulberry), and the Group Grand Limited companies.  Since 2016, when Saab met with Los Chamos and Maduro to discuss importing food on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, Saab and Pulido have made hundreds of millions of dollars from the profits of this corrupt scheme.

THE SYSTEM THAT CORRUPTED THE PROGRAM

The below individuals enriched themselves by capitalizing on a network of corruption to obtain lucrative business contracts with the Government of Venezuela.  These individuals were able to obtain CLAP-related, no-bid, and overvalued contracts from senior Venezuelan political figures through front and shell companies.  Having successfully obtained no-bid contracts, these front and shell companies would then receive approval from the Venezuelan Corporation of Foreign Trade (CORPOVEX) to import food into Venezuela.  OFAC designated Illiana Josefa Ruzza Terán on April 17, 2019 pursuant to E.O. 13692, as amended, for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela, as a Director on the Board of Directors of CORPOVEX, as well as a Director of the Central Bank of Venezuela and the Vice President of Finance of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA).  PdVSA was designated on January 28, 2019 pursuant to E.O. 13850, for operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy.

In many cases, the front or shell companies would receive a prepayment from the Government of Venezuela, after which they would distribute the funds as kickbacks to government officials that were party to the corrupt scheme.  To do this, the CLAP-contracted shell or front companies would divert the kickback funds and subtract commissions into nested corporate accounts controlled through their ownership and control of other front and shell companies.  To further obscure the money’s origin, these front and shell companies would send a portion of the stolen money to business accounts of related companies whose financial activity was not related to food supply or logistics.  Finally, using these accounts, the co-conspirators would send a portion of the stolen money to corrupt Venezuelan senior political figures, their family members, or associates.

The CLAP-contracted companies would then create fraudulent invoices reflecting a purchase of goods worth an amount aligned with the value from the original, overvalued contract.  In many cases, the CLAP-contracted companies would sub-contract with other companies to fulfill the terms of the contract, such as purchasing food or assembling food boxes often at substandard nutritional value.  The CLAP-contracted companies worked with shipping and insurance companies controlled by corrupt Venezuelan government officials or their business associates to organize the physical transport of food to Venezuelan ports. 

ILLICIT OPERATIONS IN THE VENEZUELAN GOLD SECTOR

From early 2018, as the Government of Venezuela’s shortage of foreign exchange became increasingly acute, the Government started using gold resources to pay some contracts, to include CLAP food contracts, and Saab began working with Simon Alejandro Zerpa Delgado (Zerpa) to help the Government liquidate gold mined in Venezuela and convert it into foreign currency.  Zerpa was designated on July 26, 2017 pursuant to E.O. 13692 for being a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela.  Saab, in turn, worked with members of the Venezuelan government including El Aissami, the current Minister of Industries and National Production and former Executive Vice President, to create a structure for the Government of Venezuela to sell gold to Turkey.  As a result of the Government of Venezuela’s corrupt operations in the gold sector, and to prevent Maduro and his corrupt associates from further exploiting Venezuela’s people and resources, the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy was identified as subject to sanctions by Secretary Mnuchin in November 2018.  

Saab signed a contract with Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Venezuela (BANDES) to acquire Venezuelan currency to purchase gold from local miners, and the Government of Venezuelan pressured miners to sell gold to Saab at an inflated official market rate, instead of on the black market.  BANDES was designated on March 22, 2019 pursuant to E.O. 13850, as amended, for operating in the financial sector of the Venezuelan economy.  

Some of the gold was sent to Caracas to be refined, then sold to the Central Bank of Venezuela (Banco Central de Venezuela or BCV), and subsequently exported out of Venezuela.  The BCV was designated on April 17, 2019 pursuant to E.O. 13850, as amended, for operating in the financial sector of the Venezuelan economy.  The gold was then flown to destinations such as the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.  Turkish entities would purchase gold from the Government of Venezuela, depositing money in accounts in Turkey, which in turn would transfer funds to an account held by the BCV in Turkey.  Saab’s company in Turkey, Mulberry, purchased goods in Turkey on behalf of Venezuelan clients, marking up prices before being sold back to Venezuela.

A NETWORK OF CORRUPTION AND NEPOTISM

The individuals designated today are determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or directly or indirectly engaged in, a transaction or series of transactions involving deceptive practices and corruption and the Government of Venezuela or projects or programs administered by the Government of Venezuela, or are immediate adult family members of such persons, or operate in the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy, or are current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela:

  • Alex Nain Saab Moran (Saab) is a Colombian national who, along with his business partner, Pulido, oversees a sophisticated network of front and shell companies used to acquire, assemble, and ship food to Venezuela in support of CLAP contracts, all at the most profitable rate for themselves.  Saab used the profits generated from CLAP food boxes to bribe government officials to maintain his access to government contracts.  Saab bribed several individuals, including Vielma Mora and Marco Torres.  Saab also provided kickbacks to Maduro’s stepsons, Walter, Yosser, and Yoswal (“Los Chamos”).
  • Alvaro Enrique Pulido Vargas (Pulido) (previously known as German Enrique Rubio-Salas) is a Colombian national who serves as Saab’s primary business partner.  Along with Saab, Pulido helped devise the complex corporate structure of front and shell companies that Saab and Pulido used to profit from the acquiring, assembling, distribution, and shipment of food to Venezuela.    
     
  • Emmanuel Enrique Rubio Gonzalez (Rubio) is the son of Pulido.  Rubio owns or controls one of the key food packing companies involved in the corruption network that abuses the CLAP program, Group Grand Limited S.A. de C.V., which facilitated the shipment of non-perishable food from Mexico to Venezuela.  
     
  • Walter Jacob Gavidia Flores is the oldest stepson of Maduro and, along with his two younger brothers Yosser and Yoswal, received bribes and kickbacks from Saab in exchange for giving Saab access to overvalued Venezuelan government contracts, such as the CLAP program.
     
  • Yosser Daniel Gavidia Flores is the second oldest stepson of Maduro and, along with his two brothers Walter and Yoswal, received bribes and kickbacks from Saab in exchange for giving Saab access to overvalued Venezuelan government contracts, such as the CLAP program.
     
  • Yoswal Alexander Gavidia Flores is the youngest stepson of Maduro and, along with his two older brothers Walter and Yosser, received bribes and kickbacks from Saab in exchange for giving Saab access to overvalued Venezuelan government contracts, such as the CLAP progam.
  • Jose Gregorio Vielma Mora (Vielma Mora) is the former Minister of Foreign Trade and International Investment of the Government of Venezuela.  He is also the former Governor of the Venezuelan State of Táchira.  
     
  • Shadi Nain Saab Certain (Shadi) is a son of Alex Nain Saab Moran.  Shadi was listed as a Director of Group Grand Limited from 2015 to 2017 in the company’s registration documents.
     
  • Isham Ali Saab Certain is a son of Alex Nain Saab Moran.
     
  • Mariana Andrea Staudinger Lemoine is the wife of Yosser Daniel Gavidia Flores.
     

GLOBAL NETWORK OF FRONT AND SHELL COMPANIES

Several individuals designated today played a role in establishing a global structure of front and shell companies to skim significant sums of money from commercial contracts and business activity created through the scheme.  By utilizing such a structure of offshore entities to support CLAP operations, it makes it more difficult for U.S. financial institutions to identify corrupt activity related to CLAP-related food operations.

The following companies were designated or blocked today for being owned or controlled by the aforementioned individuals, or for being responsible for or complicit in, or for being directly or indirectly involved in, any transaction or series of transactions involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of Venezuela or projects or programs administered by the Government of Venezuela.  This action also includes the identification of a luxury apartment in Miami, Florida, as blocked property in the interest of one of these companies.

  • Asasi Food FZE is registered in the UAE and is owned or controlled by Saab.  Asasi Foods FZE received money from food companies in Venezuela that were receiving food imports and paying money to food providers in Mexico as a means to facilitate the CLAP corruption scheme.  
     
  • Group Grand Limited is registered in Hong Kong and is owned or controlled by Saab.  The company served as a primary entity in the global network of shell and front companies used by both Saab and Pulido to facilitate the CLAP corruption scheme.  
     
  • Group Grand Limited, S.A. de C.V. is registered in Mexico and is owned or controlled by Rubio.  It is part of the network of shell and front companies used by Pulido and Saab to facilitate the CLAP corruption scheme.  The company has a warehouse that was used to receive food from different suppliers and assemble the food into boxes that were shipped from Mexico and sold in Venezuela as a part of the CLAP corruption scheme.  The timing of today’s action by the Treasury Department was synchronized with an action by the Government of Mexico.

 

  • Group Grand Limited General Trading is registered in the UAE and is owned or controlled by Saab.  It is a part of the global network of front and shell companies used by Saab and Pulido to facilitate the CLAP corruption scheme.

 

  • Mulberry Proje Yatirim Anonim Sirketi (Mulberry) is registered in Turkey and is responsible for or complicit in, or directly or indirectly involved in, a transaction or series of transactions involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of Venezuela or projects or programs administered by the Government of Venezuela.  Mulberry was used to facilitate payments made as a part of Saab’s CLAP corruption network for the sale of gold in Turkey.
     
  • Seafire Foundation is registered in Panama and is owned or controlled by Saab.  Saab and his direct family members were the beneficiaries of the entity that facilitated payments to Saab as a part of the CLAP corruption scheme.  
  • C I Fondo Global De Alimentos LTDA is registered in Colombia and is owned or controlled by Rubio.  
     
  • Emmr & CIA. S.A.S. is registered in Colombia and is owned or controlled by Rubio.
     
  • Global Structure, S.A. is registered in Panama and is owned or controlled by Rubio.
     
  • Multitex International Trading, S.A. is registered in Panama and is owned or controlled by Rubio.  
     
  • Sun Properties LLC is registered in Delaware and is owned or controlled by Rubio.  
     
  • Clio Management Corp. is registered in Panama and is owned or controlled by Pulido.
     
  • Silver Bay Partners FZE (Silver) is registered in the UAE and is responsible for or complicit in, or directly or indirectly involved in, a transaction or series of transactions involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of Venezuela or projects or programs administered by the Government of Venezuela.  
     

As a result of these actions, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities designated today, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by those individuals or entities, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property of blocked or designated persons.   

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intended to change behavior.  The United States has made it clear that we will consider lifting sanctions for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, each as amended, who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the Government of Venezuela, and combat corruption in Venezuela.

For additional information about the methods that Venezuelan senior political figures, their associates, and front persons use to move and hide corrupt proceeds, including how they try to exploit the U.S. financial system and real estate market, please refer to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) advisories FIN-2019-A002, “Updated Advisory on Widespread Public Corruption in Venezuela,” FIN-2017-A006, “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals” and FIN-2018-A003, “Advisory on Human Rights Abuses Enabled by Corrupt Senior Foreign Political Figures and their Financial Facilitators.”

and State Department:

On July 25, the United States sanctioned five individuals involved in a complex network of bribery and money laundering that has been stealing from the people of Venezuela for years, as well as an additional five individuals and 13 entities connected to these corrupt actors.  Among the individuals involved were Maduro’s three stepsons (Walter, Yosser and Yoswal), and Colombian businessman, Alex Saab, the orchestrator of the corruption network, and sons of First Lady Cilia Flores.

Using a social welfare program that many Venezuelans are forced to depend on for their survival, Maduro and his cronies turned the program into a political weapon and self-enriching mechanism.  As noted in the UN Office of the High Commissioner and Human Rights July 5 report, the former Maduro regime’s misallocation of resources and corruption have contributed to the economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela..  While Maduro’s stepsons and other criminal associates used a food allocation program to steal hundreds of millions of dollars, many Venezuelans eat once or at most twice per day, with few proteins and vitamins.

Meanwhile, Interim President Juan Guaido and the National Assembly are leading efforts that respond directly to the peoples’ needs. Since January 23, organizations and volunteers have responded to Guaido’s call through weekend health fairs and humanitarian camps that have delivered urgent medical and hygiene care to over 130,000 Venezuelans in all 24 states.

With our democratic partners in the region and around the world, the United States will continue to support interim President Guaido, the National Assembly, and the people of Venezuela.

issued related press releases.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Department Press Release

State Department Press Release

State Designates Zimbabwe official under Section 7031(c)

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The Secretary of State is publicly designating Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe, former Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army’s Presidential Guard Brigade and current Ambassador Designate of Zimbabwe to Tanzania, under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights.  Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.  The Department has credible information that Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe was involved in the violent crackdown against unarmed Zimbabweans during post-election protests on August 1, 2018 that resulted in six civilian deaths.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and immediate family members.  In addition to the designation of Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe, the Department is also publicly designating his spouse, Chido Machona.

To date, the Government of Zimbabwe has held no member of the security forces accountable for the acts of violence committed against Zimbabweans on August 1, 2018.  Furthermore, there has been no accountability for the excessive use of force by Zimbabwean security forces on civilians in January and February this year, which reportedly resulted in at least 13 deaths, 600 victims of violence, torture or rape, and more than 1,000 arrests.  We again call on Zimbabwean authorities to hold accountable those officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses in Zimbabwe.

Link:

State Department Press Release

September 5, 2019: Liviu Nicolae Dragnea designated under Section 7031(c) for corruption

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Secretary Michael R. Pompeo is publicly designating the former Speaker of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, Liviu Nicolae Dragnea, due to his involvement in significant corruption.  This designation is made under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116-6).  Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that officials of foreign governments have been involved in significant corruption, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their immediate family members.  In addition to the designation of Mr. Dragnea, the Secretary is also publicly designating Mr. Dragnea’s two children, Valentin Ştefan Dragnea and Maria Alexandra Dragnea.

Today’s action sends a strong signal that the United States is committed to fighting corruption and supporting the rule of law in Romania.

For more information, please contact INL-PAPD@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Notice

October 10, 2019: OFAC’s Anniversary present to Mr. Watchlist – New Global Magnitsky designations, and changes to Iran, counter terrorism and NPWMD programs

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Yesterday, OFAC added the following persons to the SDN List under its Global Magnitsky human rights sanctions program:

ESSA, Salim (a.k.a. ESSA, Salim Aziz), Johannesburg, South Africa; DOB 15 Jan 1978; nationality South Africa; Gender Male; Passport M00073786 (South Africa) issued 09 Nov 2012 expires 08 Nov 2022; National ID No. 7801155017084 (South Africa) (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Ajay (a.k.a. GUPTA, Ajay Kumar), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 05 Feb 1966; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality India; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Atul (a.k.a. GUPTA, Atul Kumar), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 14 Jun 1968; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality South Africa; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

GUPTA, Rajesh (a.k.a. GUPTA, Rajesh Kumar; a.k.a. “GUPTA, Tony”), Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 05 Aug 1972; POB Saharanpur, India; nationality South Africa; Gender Male; National ID No. 7208056345087 (South Africa) (individual) [GLOMAG].

and changed the following 2 listings under the Iran (both), counter terrorism and/or non-proliferation programs (1 each):

BAHMAN GROUP, No. 37, Saba Boulevard, Africa Street, P.O. Box 14335-835, Tehran 1917773844, Iran; Website http://www.bahmangroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: ANDISHEH MEHVARAN INVESTMENT COMPANY). -to- BAHMAN GROUP, No. 37, Saba Boulevard, Africa Street, P.O. Box 14335-835, Tehran 1917773844, Iran; Website http://www.bahmangroup.com; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions [SDGT] [IFSR] (Linked To: ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS). 

 

ROSTAMIAN, Kambiz, Villa No 13, Cluster 31 Juemierah Islands, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 27 Aug 1960; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport RE0003026 (Saint Kitts and Nevis); alt. Passport I17217816 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR]. -to- ROSTAMIAN, Kambiz, Villa No 13, Cluster 31 Juemierah Islands, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; DOB 27 Aug 1960; Additional Sanctions Information – Subject to Secondary Sanctions; Passport RE0003028 (Saint Kitts and Nevis); alt. Passport I17217816 (Iran) (individual) [NPWMD] [IFSR].  

And Treasury:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Members of a Significant Corruption Network in South Africa 

Global Magnitsky designations target members of family business engaged in corruption, including bribery and misappropriation of state assets

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign AssetsControl (OFAC) sanctioned members of a significant corruption network in South Africa that leveraged overpayments on government contracts, bribery, and other corrupt acts to fund political contributions and influence government actions.  Specifically, OFAC designated Ajay Gupta, Atul Gupta, Rajesh Gupta, and Salim Essa for their involvement in corruption in South Africa pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

“The Gupta family leveraged its political connections to engage in widespread corruption and bribery, capture government contracts, and misappropriate state assets.  Treasury’s designation targets the Guptas’ pay-to-play political patronage, which was orchestrated at the expense of the South African people,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “The Guptas and Essa have used their influence with prominent politicians and parties to line their pockets with ill-gotten gains.  We will continue to exclude from the U.S. financial system those who profit from corruption.”

Today’s sanctions announcement demonstrates the U.S. government’s unwavering commitment to supporting the rule of law and accountability in South Africa.  We support the anti-corruption efforts of South Africa’s independent judiciary, law enforcement agencies, and the ongoing judicial commissions of inquiry.  Moreover, we commend the extraordinary work by South Africa’s civil society activists, investigative journalists, and whistleblowers, who have exposed the breadth and depth of the Gupta family’s corruption. 

THE GUPTA FAMILY

Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta immigrated to South Africa in the 1990s, and due in large part to their generous donations to a political party and their reportedly close relationship with former South African President Jacob Zuma, their business interests expanded.  The family has been implicated in several corrupt schemes in South Africa, allegedly stealing hundreds of millions of dollars through illegal deals with the South African government, obfuscated by a shadowy network of shell companies and associates linked to the family.  

Credible reports of these corruption schemes include the Gupta family offering members of the South African government money or elevated positions within the government, in return for their cooperation with Gupta family business efforts.  Public reporting has revealed Gupta family efforts to garner the cooperation of a potential Minister of Finance by promising millions of dollars in return for the individual’s assistance in removing key members of the South African government who were considered to be stumbling blocks to the Gupta family’s enterprises.  In another instance of an attempt to obtain the assistance of a member of government through illicit means, Rajesh reportedly promised a cut of a large scale development project to a provincial minister in return for the minister’s assistance.  While making this offer, Rajesh reportedly referred to two other politically powerful individuals present at the meeting as receiving large monthly payments, similar to the one being offered the provincial minister, directly from Rajesh in return for their assistance with a mining project.  In addition, the Gupta family was overpaid for government contracts and then used a portion of the proceeds of those overpayments to donate money to a South African political party.  Further, the family paid money to a South African government official in exchange for the appointment of other government officials friendly to the Gupta family business interests.  As a part of their corrupt business enterprise, South African government officials and business executives discussed ways to capture government contracts and then move the proceeds of those contracts through Gupta-owned businesses. 

AJAY GUPTA

Ajay Gupta (Ajay) is being designated for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Ajay is the family patriarch who formulated the family’s corrupt business strategies and controlled its finances. 

ATUL GUPTA

Atul Gupta (Atul) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Atul is widely known to have overseen the Gupta family’s outreach to corrupt government officials.

RAJESH GUPTA

Rajesh Gupta (Rajesh) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

Rajesh cultivated important relationships with the sons of powerful South African politicians and led efforts to pursue business and relationships in a South African province where corruption was rampant.  Rajesh attempted to use at least one of those relationships to seek undue influence with additional members of a South African political party.

SALIM ESSA

Salim Essa, a business associate of the Gupta family, has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery. 

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals named above, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other designated persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.  In addition, any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by E.O. 13818 if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States would be prohibited.

GLOBAL MAGNITSKY

Building upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, on December 20, 2017, the President signed E.O. 13818, in which the President found that the prevalence of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, had reached such scope and gravity that it threatens the stability of international political and economic systems.  Human rights abuse and corruption undermine the values that form an essential foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies; have devastating impacts on individuals; weaken democratic institutions; degrade the rule of law; perpetuate violent conflicts; facilitate the activities of dangerous persons; and undermine economic markets.  The United States seeks to impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons. 

To date, the Department of the Treasury has designated 118 individuals and entities under E.O. 13818.  This figure is in addition to the numerous human rights- or corruption-related designations Treasury has issued under other various authorities.  In total, since January of 2017, Treasury has taken action against more than 680 individuals and entities engaged in activities related to, or directly involving, human rights abuse or corruption. 

and State:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four individuals for corruption in South Africa pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  Specifically, OFAC designated Ajay Gupta, Atul Gupta, Rajesh Gupta, and Salim Essa for their involvement in corrupt schemes with government officials and employees in state-owned enterprises for their own personal gain.  As a result of today’s actions, any property, or interest in property, of those designated within U.S. jurisdiction is blocked.  Additionally, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with blocked persons, including entities owned or controlled by designated persons.

Today’s action demonstrates continued U.S. commitment to promoting transparency, accountability, and the rule of law globally.  We commend the critical role played by South Africa’s civil society activists, whistleblowers, and investigative journalists to shine the spotlight on the Gupta network’s elicitation of criminal abuse of public office and other acts of corruption, which have deterred investment and impeded South Africa’s economic growth.  The United States strongly supports ongoing efforts by the Government of South Africa, including its independent judiciary, judicial commissions of inquiry, and law enforcement agencies, to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of corruption.  Successfully prosecuting and deterring corruption is essential to building a future of accountable government that fosters economic growth and opportunity for all of South Africa’s citizens.

both issued press releases.

As you can see, although the Magnitsky sanctions program is ostensibly about human rights abuses, the “global” (i,e. Besides Russia) version includes corruption. Why not just a corruption program? Mr. Watchlist wonders…

Links:

OFAC Notice

Treasury Press Release

State Department Press Release

October 11, 2019: South Sudan Global Magnitsky additions

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On Friday, OFAC added the following 2 persons:

AJING ATER, Kur (a.k.a. AJING ATER KUR, Kur; a.k.a. AJING, Kur), Juba, South Sudan; DOB 02 Jan 1962; POB Equatorial Guinea; nationality South Sudan; Gender Male; Passport B00001010 (South Sudan) expires 11 Aug 2022 (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed (a.k.a. HUSSEIN, Ashraf Said Ahmed; a.k.a. HUSSEIN, Ashraf Seed Ahmed; a.k.a. SEED AHMED, Asharaf; a.k.a. SEED AHMED, Ashraff; a.k.a. SEEDAHMED, Ashiraf; a.k.a. “ALI, Ashraf Sayed”; a.k.a. “HUSSEIN ALI, Ashraf”), 1 College Yard, Winchester Avenue, London, England NW6 7UA, United Kingdom; 207 Jersey Road, Osterley, London TW7 4RE, United Kingdom; DOB 01 Jan 1957 to 31 Jan 1957; nationality Sudan; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

and 6 entities:

 

AL CARDINAL INVESTMENTS CO. LTD (a.k.a. AL-CARDINAL INVESTMENTS COMPANY LIMITED), 201 Kasini Road, Mombasa, Kenya; Juba, South Sudan; Tax ID No. 100104695 (South Sudan) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed). 

 

ALCARDINAL GENERAL TRADING LIMITED, 207 Jersey Road, Osterley, London TW7 4RE, United Kingdom; Company Number 08227698 (United Kingdom) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed). 

 

ALCARDINAL GENERAL TRADING LLC, Dubai, United Arab Emirates [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed). 

 

ALCARDINAL PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. ALCARDINAL PETROLEUM CO. LTD), Mombasa, Kenya; Juba, South Sudan [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed). 

 

LOU TRADING AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED (a.k.a. LOU TRADING AND INVESTMENT CO LTD; a.k.a. LOU TRADING AND INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD), Juba, South Sudan; Tax ID No. 100108046 (South Sudan) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AJING ATER, Kur). 

 

NILETEL, Juba, South Sudan [GLOMAG] (Linked To: AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed).

to its SDN List under its Global Magnitsky human rights abuses and corruption sanctions program.

And Treasury:

PRESS RELEASES

Treasury Sanctions Businessmen in South Sudan for Corrupt Dealings with Government Officials and Sanctions Evasion

Global Magnitsky designations target government insiders engaging in bribery, kickbacks, and procurement fraud while draining state coffers

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal (Al-Cardinal) and Kur Ajing Ater (Ajing) for their involvement in bribery, kickbacks and procurement fraud with senior government officials.  OFAC is also designating five companies determined to be owned or controlled by Al-Cardinal, and one company owned or controlled by Ajing.  OFAC designated these individuals and entities pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption. 

“These South Sudanese elites and corrupt government officials have drained state coffers and usurped the country’s resources with impunity.  Al-Cardinal and Ajing leverage their businesses and political connections to engage in corruption at great expense to the South Sudanese people,” said Sigal Mandelker, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “The South Sudanese government must take urgent measures to increase transparency and enforce accountability against those involved in systemic corruption.  Privileged elites should not be allowed to profit from conflict as they undermine efforts to bring lasting peace to South Sudan.” 

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities named below, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by them, individually, or with other designated persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or otherwise exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.  In addition, any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by E.O. 13818 if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States would be prohibited.

ASHRAF SEED AHMED AL-CARDINAL

Sudanese businessman Al-Cardinal has been used by a senior South Sudanese government official as an intermediary to deposit and hold a large amount of funds in a country outside of South Sudan.  Following OFAC’s designation of Benjamin Bol Mel in December 2017, the senior South Sudanese official began to use a bank account in the name of one of Al-Cardinal’s companies to store his personal funds in an attempt to avoid the effects of potential sanctions designations.  Further, in early 2019, the South Sudanese government made millions of dollars in payments to a company owned by Al-Cardinal; while the official reason was for the payment for food, the money instead went to senior South Sudanese government officials.  Other South Sudanese government officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the massive corruption in the South Sudanese government, noting that although large amounts of money were paid to Al-Cardinal for supplies and provisions, government forces never seemed to be adequately supplied. 

Separately, a company partially owned by Al-Cardinal has been publicly implicated in the importation of amphibious armored vehicles into South Sudan that gave the Government of South Sudan the ability to extend offensives that included violent attacks on innocent civilians.

Five companies owned or controlled by Al-Cardinal were also designated today:  Alcardinal General Trading Limited, Alcardinal General Trading LLC, Al Cardinal Investments Co. LTD, Alcardinal Petroleum Company limited, and NILETEL.

Al-Cardinal is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.

KUR AJING ATER

Ajing is a South Sudanese businessman who has bribed key officials in the Government of South Sudan in order to maintain influence and access to the South Sudanese oil market.  Ajing used these bribes to both curry favor with a senior gatekeeper within the Government of South Sudan and to ensure the silence and compliance of a key government officials.  In late 2018, the South Sudanese government made a large cash payment to Ajing.  While the official reason was for the payment of food, the money instead went directly to a senior South Sudanese government official.  In addition, Ajing has been obligated large amounts of oil by the Government of South Sudan, and has given money and vehicles to government officials in return.  Ajing has claimed to have paid senior officials millions of dollars and has cooperated with the request of a senior official to route oil payments in cash rather than through official bank accounts.  Further, Ajing was the recipient of a multi-year contract to purchase food for the South Sudanese military, and in return, paid a percentage of the contract back to a senior South Sudanese government official.  According to public media reports, Ajing received millions of dollars in contracts for the South Sudanese military, including one contract that alone exceeds the total amount budgeted for the military’s goods and services for the year by a factor of ten.

Ajing is being designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery.  One company owned or controlled by Ajing was also designated today:  Lou Trading and Investment Company Limited.

GLOBAL MAGNITSKY

Building upon the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, on December 20, 2017, the President signed E.O. 13818, in which the President found that the prevalence of human rights abuse and corruption which have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, had reached such scope and gravity that it threatens the stability of international political and economic systems.  Human rights abuse and corruption undermine the values that form an essential foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies; have devastating impacts on individuals; weaken democratic institutions; degrade the rule of law; perpetuate violent conflicts; facilitate the activities of dangerous persons; and undermine economic markets.  The United States seeks to impose tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons. 

To date, the Department of the Treasury has designated 122 individuals and entities under E.O. 13818.  This figure is in addition to the numerous human rights or corruption related designations Treasury has issued under other various authorities.  In total, since January of 2017, Treasury has taken action against more than 680 individuals and entities with links to human rights abuse or corruption. 

and State:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal (Al-Cardinal) and Kur Ajing Ater (Ajing) for their involvement in corruption in South Sudan.  Five companies determined to be owned or controlled by Al-Cardinal and one company owned or controlled by Ajing were also sanctioned.

OFAC designated these individuals and entities pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption.  Today’s action demonstrates continued U.S. commitment to prevent and combat corruption globally.

The corrupt activities of these individuals robbed critical resources from a war-torn country.  The population of South Sudan faces food insecurity, and an estimated one-third of South Sudanese have been forced to flee their homes.

We urge the Government of South Sudan to take seriously the clear linkage between corrupt activities and the motive of some elites to disrupt the peace agreement, the implementation of which has reached a critical stage.

issued press releases.

Links:

OFAC Notice

Press Releases: State, Treasury


October 25, 2019: Owen Ncube designated under Section 7031(c)

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Today, the Department designates Owen Ncube under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. A, P.L. 116-59) due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights.  Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals are ineligible for entry into the United States and may be publically or privately designated as such by the Secretary of State.  The Department has credible information that Owen Ncube was involved in gross violations of human rights in his capacity as Zimbabwe’s Minister of State for National Security.

We are deeply troubled by the Zimbabwean government’s use of state-sanctioned violence against peaceful protestors, and civil society, as well as against labor leaders and members of the opposition leaders in Zimbabwe.  We urge the government to stop the violence, investigate, and hold accountable officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses in Zimbabwe.

U.S. sanctions target those who engage in corruption, violate human rights, and undermine democratic institutions or processes.  State-sanctioned violence creates a culture of impunity for human rights abusers. The United States continues to support the Zimbabwean people in need, especially through humanitarian and health assistance.  We will continue to press the Government of Zimbabwe to implement necessary political and economic reforms to provide Zimbabwean citizens the prosperity, security, and well-being they deserve.

Link:

State Department Press Release

US State Department designates Former Kenya Attorney General due to significant corruption

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Today, the Department designates former Kenyan Attorney General Amos Sitswila Wako due to his involvement in significant corruption.  This designation is made under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Div. F, P.L. 116-6), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020 (Div. A, P.L. 116-59).  Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that officials of foreign governments have been involved in significant corruption, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

The law also requires the Secretary of State to publicly or privately designate such officials and their immediate family members.  In addition to the designation of Mr. Wako, the Department is also publicly designating Wako’s wife, Flora Ngaira, and son, Julius Wako.

Today’s action sends a strong signal that the United States is a valuable partner in Kenya’s fight against corruption.  Economic prosperity for all Kenyans is only possible by defeating the scourge of corruption, which also requires a functional, fair, and transparent criminal justice system.  The United States will continue to stand with all Kenyans as they strive to curb and punish corruption in Kenya.

For more information, please contact INL-PAPD@state.gov.

Link:

State Department Press Release

December 6, 2019: OFAC designates Iraqis under Global Magnitsky sanctions

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On Friday, OFAC added the following persons:


 

AL-ISSAWI, Khamis Farhan Al-Khanjar (a.k.a. ALESSAWI, Khamis F Ali; a.k.a. ALI, Khamees Farhan Ali; a.k.a. ALI, Khames Farhan Ali; a.k.a. AL-KHANJAR, Khamis), Jordan; Iraq; DOB 1965; alt. DOB 08 Sep 1968; alt. DOB 08 Sep 1965; POB Fallujah, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Gender Male; Passport D1022354 (Iraq) expires 21 May 2023 (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

AL-KHAZALI, Laith (a.k.a. ALAZIREG, Layth Hadi Sayyid), Iraq; DOB 14 Oct 1975; nationality Iraq; Gender Male; Passport A10537439 (Iraq) expires 16 Oct 2023 (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

AL-KHAZALI, Qais (a.k.a. ALAZEREJ, Qays Hadi Sayyid; a.k.a. AL-KHAZALI, Qais Hadi Sayed Hasan), Iraq; DOB 20 Jun 1974; alt. DOB 1974; POB Baghdad, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG]. 

 

AL-LAMI, Hussein Falah (a.k.a. AL-LAMI, Abu Zainab; a.k.a. AZIZ, Hussein Faleh), Iraq; DOB 20 Jun 1969; POB Baghdad, Iraq; nationality Iraq; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

under its Global Magnitsky human rights abuses and corruption sanctions.

The State Department both issued a press release:

The United States recently expressed its commitment to using its legal authorities to sanction corrupt individuals stealing the Iraqi people’s public wealth and killing and wounding peaceful protesters. Today, we are honoring that pledge by sanctioning four Iraqis implicated in serious human rights abuses and corruption.  The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iranian-backed militia leaders Qais al-Khazali, Laith al-Khazali, and Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, for their involvement in serious human rights abuses in Iraq.  Additionally, OFAC designated Iraqi politician Khamis Farhan al-Khanjar al-Issawi for bribing government officials and for widespread corruption at the expense of the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi people want their country back. They are calling for genuine reform and accountability and for trustworthy leaders who will put Iraq’s national interests first. Those demands deserve to be addressed without resort to violence or suppression.  Human rights abuses and corruption undermine the values that are at the foundation of stable, secure, and functioning societies.

As the world prepares to recognize International Anticorruption Day on December 9 and International Human Rights Day on December 10, the United States is doing its part to advance those very same values and to hold to account those who would undermine them through human rights abuses or acts of corruption.

and held a briefing:

MS ORTAGUS:  Thank you for joining us for this important briefing.  With us today is Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker.  He’ll be addressing the protests in Iraq and announcing the designation of individuals under the Global Magnitsky Act.  Assistant Secretary Schenker will begin with some opening remarks, and then we will take a few questions.

David.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Thanks, Morgan.  Good afternoon.  Today the United States is sanctioning three Iraqis for their involvement in the brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in Iraq, and a fourth for corruption and bribery.

Treasury designated Qais al-Khazali, Laith al-Khazali, Husayn Falih ‘Aziz al-Lami, pursuant to Executive Order 13818 for their involvement in serious human rights abuses in Iraq.  Additionally, OFAC designated politician Khamis Farhan al-Khanjar al-Issawi for bribing government officials and engaging in widespread corruption at the expense of the Iraqi people.

According to the UN, over 400 Iraqis have been killed while protesting for better governance and a brighter future.  For several months, the Iraqi people have led a patriotic quest for genuine reform and transparency in government.  They have gone to the streets to raise their voices for a just government with leaders who will put Iraq’s national interests first.

Frankly, without that commitment from Iraq’s political leaders, it makes little difference who they designate as prime minister.  As I said last week, Iraqis are fed up with economic stagnation, endemic corruption, and mismanagement.  They want better from their leaders, and they want accountability.

Iraqis are also demanding their country back.  Three of today’s designees – al-Lami, Qais al-Khazali and Laith al-Khazali – were directed by Iranian regime when they or the armed groups they lead committed serious human rights abuses.  Iraqis have paid a steep and bloody price for the malign influence of Iranian regime.  Tehran claims it is exporting “revolution”.  It is increasingly clear to us and the people of the region, however, that the theocracy’s top export is corruption and repression.

As for Khamis al-Khanjar, he’s wielded significant political influence through the bribery of Iraqi political figures.  The Iraqi people are protesting corruption of this very sort.

The U.S. Government continues to support Iraq’s security, stability, and sovereignty.  As the Secretary has said on many occasions, we are a force for good.  We are the largest donor of humanitarian, stabilization, demining, and security assistance to Iraq, and we want to maintain and expand that role to include helping with economic reform to create jobs for Iraqis and Americans alike.  We offer an unparalleled partnership for the Iraqi people, but we need to see Iraqi leaders committed to that partnership – equally committed to that partnership.

With that, I’ll now take some questions.

MS ORTAGUS:  Matt.

QUESTION:  I just – so when the Secretary and you have, in the past, over the past couple weeks, warned that Iraqi officials themselves – not only militia leaders or politicians, but actual government officials – could be subjected to sanctions for their actions, why not take that step today?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Well, thanks, Matt.  Listen, GLOMAG in particular has a very high evidentiary standard.  They take a long time to put together packages.  If you want to know all the details and how long they take in particular, we’ve got Marshall Billingslea sitting over here somewhere.  Where is he?

MS ORTAGUS:  Over here.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Over here, from Treasury.  He’s going to – we’re going to answer some questions.

QUESTION:  You let him in the building?

MS ORTAGUS:  It’s Friday.  (Laughter.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  But we’re not done.  This is an ongoing process.  We’re – these designations don’t prejudice future announcements —

QUESTION:  No, I’m not suggesting —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  — and we will be doing further designations in the future, which I can’t comment on right now.

QUESTION:  Well, does your – does that answer mean that you just haven’t compiled enough evidence against actual official – government officials?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  I’m not going to say which ones that we’re working on or we’re not working —

QUESTION:  No, no, I’m not asking for names, but is that still in the works?  And do you still – do you put out the same warning to them that if this continues, they’re going to get —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah, so if you are a gross violator of human rights, if you are perpetrating violence against protesters, regardless of whether you are in the government or outside the government, you’re at risk of being designated, absolutely.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

MS ORTAGUS:  Nadia.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Hey, Nadia.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  How are you?

QUESTION:  Good to see you, David.  So some people say – well, three of these people that you have listed are in militias that belong to Asaib Ahl al-Haq, I believe?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yes.

QUESTION:  Some people will say, what is the effect of these sanctions?  These guys don’t have bank accounts in the U.S., they don’t travel to the U.S., so it’s just symbolic sanctions.  So how do you respond to that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Well, we are holding these people to account.  When possible, we’re going after the assets.  Regardless of whether the Iraqi Government holds these people to account, we are holding them to account in the ways that we can.  And there is an impact, but it is first and foremost symbolic, but in many cases also has a financial impact on the ability of these people to travel and do business elsewhere.

QUESTION:  Would you also – sorry, would you also hold the Iraqi Government officials who deal with them accountable?  Will they be also under sanction if they deal with them directly, with —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  I’m going to defer to Marshall on that.  My belief is yes.

MS ORTAGUS:  We’ll follow up.  We’ll get that answer for you.

Francesco.

QUESTION:  Hi, thanks.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Hi.

QUESTION:  How worried are you about Iran – Iran’s involvement in the negotiations for the formation of the new government in Baghdad, and will you be ready to work with any prime minister if he’s – you feel he’s too close to Iran?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Well, okay, there’s two parts to that question.  Listen, the United States Government will work with anyone in the Iraqi Government who is willing to put Iraqi interests first.  Right.  This is a sine qua non.  But we see in the process of establishing a new government or determining who the next prime minister will be that Qasem Soleimani is in Baghdad working this issue.  It seems to us that foreign terrorist leaders, or military leaders, should not be meeting with Iraqi political leaders to determine the next premier of Iraq, and this is exactly what the Secretary says about being perhaps the textbook example of why Iran does not behave and is not a normal state.  This is not normal.  This is not reasonable.  This is unorthodox and it is incredibly problematic, and it is a huge violation of Iraqi sovereignty.

MS ORTAGUS:  Humeyra.

QUESTION:  Thank you for this.  Over the past couple of days, there has been some reports about Pentagon officials citing fresh intelligence about maybe potential new aggression from Iran.  Do you have similar intelligence?  What targeted and specific and new steps would you be taking to counter that to avoid another Abqaiq?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Listen, there’s a couple of different reports coming out about Iran.  There’s been great attention lately being paid to these reports about Iranian ballistic missiles being stored in Iraq.  This is something that actually Secretary Pompeo tweeted about in 2018, and something that I have said for the past four or five months on the record and on background to the bullpen and elsewhere, to all of you.  And I think this is drawing greater attention particularly as Iranian-backed militias are now shelling Iraqi bases with American and Anti-ISIS Coalition forces on them – Balad, al-Asad, et cetera.

So this is something of great concern.  The Iranians oftentimes, or have certainly in the past taken aggressive action when they feel under pressure.  We see that in the response to, for example, the maximum pressure campaign working over the months.  The past five, six months, Iran has become increasingly more aggressive.  There is a trajectory, right, where they have first increased the operational tempo of the Houthis against the Saudis, then raised the rhetoric and the temperature in Iraq against U.S. personnel, moving on from there scuttling boats in Fujairah, then kidnapping boats, then shooting down U.S. drones in international airspace, and most recently Abqaiq, targeting directly with their own missiles Saudi oil facilities.

QUESTION:  There – sorry, so you can confirm that attack on Balad?  Is that what – you just mentioned – I just want to make sure.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  An attack on Balad occurred.

QUESTION:  There’s one that was just reported I guess overnight.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  An attack occurred.  What would I —

QUESTION:  Yeah.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Sorry, the —

QUESTION:  I mean, you mentioned it.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  I’d say that we’re waiting for full evidence, but —

QUESTION:  All right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  — if past is any – if past is prologue, I’d say there’s a good chance it was Iran that’s behind it.

QUESTION:  And then you seem to suggest right now that the maximum pressure campaign is a success because it has resulted in greater Iranian aggression and shooting down U.S. drones.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  I – no.

QUESTION:  Well, that’s —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Maybe that’s what you inferred.

QUESTION:  No, no, no, that’s – that’s – well, no, that’s I think the way —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  The pressure campaign is working.  They are clearly under fear and pressure, and they are lashing out.  They are also —

QUESTION:  Yeah, but if that’s a success, I mean —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  They’re also having double-digit negative growth.

QUESTION:  Fair enough.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  The people in the streets are protesting against the regime for its corruption and for its economic mismanagement —

QUESTION:  Yeah, but surely there’s —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  — for spending all the money of the Iranian people on militias abroad, like in —

QUESTION:  Surely the metric – surely the metric for the success of U.S. policy, foreign policy anywhere, not just with Iran, is that the country – the other country is less aggressive and less likely to shoot down U.S. drones or attack U.S. bases or threaten —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  There is – no, Matt, there’s – to be fair, there – things sometimes get worse before they get better in those terms.

MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, Said.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Thank you, sir.  Should the United States take some blame for the current situation in Iraq?  I mean, after all, Qais al-Khazali, Laith al-Khazali, al-Lami, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, al-Hashd Shaabi, they were all – they have been there for a very long, long time.  In fact, they were – they flourished during the years of the occupation and sometimes cooperating with the Americans and so on.  That’s one.

And second, would you support, let’s say, redrafting another constitution, because this constitution is really what thrusted Iraq where it is today.  Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah, thank you.  So I’m not going to weigh in about whether we should take blame for Qais al-Khazali or Laith al-Khazali.  These people were there.  They’re indigenous to Iran.  They existed – U.S. Forces did not kill them.  We tried to work with whoever we could work with at the time.

That said, whether Iraq should have a new constitution, this is up to the people of Iraq.  I can tell you right now they are working on a new electoral law.  They are working on developing an independent electoral commission.  But yeah, they certainly need reforms.  The politicians – many of the people on the council of representatives, Iraqi people say that they are not accountable to their constituents.  And I don’t know what the solution is for that, but the Iraqi people, I think, want some significant reform, both economic reform, fight against corruption, and in terms of their political system.

MS ORTAGUS:  Go ahead, (inaudible).

QUESTION:  Yes.  Yesterday in a briefing, a senior official said Iraq is limited in what they can do in terms of sovereignty.  How you are planning to help them?  What is the U.S. strategy, just only sanctions?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  We’re doing sanctions.  We’re working to help Iraq Government strengthen institutions.  We are encouraging neighbors not to meddle and undermine these institutions within the country and to corrupt politicians.  So we are doing what we can.  We are 5,000 miles away.  We are the leading provider of foreign assistance to Iraq, and we work very closely with the Iraqi Government.  But as Adil Abdul-Mahdi has said, Iran is our neighbor; the United States is our friend.  I believe we are a force of good there, but we are also 5,000 miles away.  We are helping fight ISIS in Iraq, and we are helping to build a capable security apparatus, and we are trying to hold accountable those who are killing protesters, inciting violence, and undermining the basic rights of the Iraqi people.

At the same time, we are helping the Iraqi people by doing things that the Iraqi people are demanding that their government has not been successful with.  We have, over the past four months, I believe, rehabilitated some 500 schools, 100-plus hospitals, 50 water treatment facilities.  That’s over – sorry, over the past four years.  So we are doing things that create a better environment for the government to be able to handle difficult problems.

MS ORTAGUS:  Lara.

QUESTION:  Thanks.  The sanctions against the three people who are linked to Iranian-backed militias, I’m wondering if the State Department is also considering sanctions or Treasury considering sanctions against the sovereign government forces of Iraq that have cracked down on the Iraqi people.  And secondly, I just want to clarify something.  When you’re talking about the maximum pressure campaign and how that has spawned more aggressive actions by Iran, would you include its crackdown on its own people?  Is the maximum pressure campaign a driver for these protests in Iran?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Well, I’ll start with Iran.  Listen, I think that the sanctions have put additional pressure on the Iranian Government financially, forcing it to make more difficult choices, and so maybe this has brought into clearer relief for the Iranian people just how corrupt and I think callous their leadership is to the needs of the Iranian people, that they would be prioritizing at a higher level, for example, sending missiles to the Houthis or backing the Assad regime in Syria or funding Hizballah to several hundred – $700 million a year perhaps rather than providing basic services to their own people.  So I think this has exacerbated an already frustrated situation for an already frustrated people.

As for whether the United States Government will sanction the institution of the security forces in Iraq, we don’t comment on things like that.

QUESTION:  Or its leaders?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Individuals – like I said, if we can ascertain who they are, certainly they would be something that would be well within the purview of our legal authorities.

MS ORTAGUS:  Okay, we’ll do one more.  Go ahead.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Ahmed of Voice of America Persian Service.  My question is about Iran, mentioned one too many times here.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah.

QUESTION:  Do you have any – I mean, can the State Department verify any number of death tolls in Iran?  Is it around couple of hundreds, is it a thousand?  And my second question is that —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Did Brian Hook say that yesterday?

MS ORTAGUS:  He talked about it yesterday, yeah.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  I think it’s hundreds.

MS ORTAGUS:  Do you have something that Brian – a question about something Brian didn’t brief yesterday, something related to today?

QUESTION:  Yes.  Yeah, more or less.  So —

QUESTION:  I have something.

MS ORTAGUS:  No, you’re done for today.

QUESTION:  What?

QUESTION:  So this is – December is a month that the U.S. would be the rotating head of the United Nations Security Council.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yes, yes.

QUESTION:  Would you take this opportunity to exert any kind of pressure on the regime in Iran, especially the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231?  On October next year it’s coming to an end, and there are two issues there:  Iran can buy arms, and also Qasem Soleimani will be released of his restriction to travel.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah, listen, the Soleimani UNSCR that banning – bans his travel is – obviously we consider this to be a very important resolution.  Likewise, the Secretary has spoken many times publicly about Iran’s problematic behavior and how much worse it would be in some – I don’t know, what is it, 12 months from now, when Iran can – according to the UN could – when the ban or the limitation on their export – arms export stops.  So yeah, it would be something that I’m sure that USUN is looking at and would be a priority for us.

MS ORTAGUS:  I think Kelly Craft did a press conference today, so you might want to check – I think it was today.

QUESTION:  Yes.

MS ORTAGUS:  Yeah.  So you might want to check her.  She might be talking about this, yeah.

QUESTION:  (Off-mike.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah.  Yeah, was there anything else I missed on —

QUESTION:  You don’t have the – any figures that – I’m sorry, the State Department can state and verify?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Oh, the figures.  Yeah, no, I – it was – I think it was in the – I don’t know if we verified them.  I think the figure that is generally being bandied about is in the low hundreds.

MS ORTAGUS:  To a – yeah, we don’t —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  But we really don’t know.

QUESTION:  Can – you probably won’t have an answer to this, but the House – can you take this question if you don’t have an answer?  The House just passed a legislation opposing settlements, Israeli settlements, and also —

MS ORTAGUS:  That’s a big surprise.  No, we can’t take the question.

QUESTION:  Why not?  And also saying that Israel should not be allowed to annex the Jordan Valley.  So since the Secretary just met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and you were there, presumably, right?  Both of you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Well, it was actually – it was a four eyes meeting, but I did talk to the Secretary —

MS ORTAGUS:  Meaning it was the two of them.  It was a one-on-one.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Yeah, sorry.  I can tell you that —

MS ORTAGUS:  Four eyes —

QUESTION:  Oh, oh, oh, oh.  Sorry.  I thought you were being —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  So I can tell you that there’s —

QUESTION:  I thought we were going back to the schoolyard insult.  (Laughter.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHENKER:  Sorry.  Yeah, no, no, no.  So it was a one-on-one, but I can tell you I spoke with the Secretary.  I can tell you that there was no annexation plan, full or partial, for any part of the West Bank was presented to – by Israel to the United States during the meeting, and that has long been the U.S. Government position, that the ultimate disposition of territory is to be determined between the parties.

QUESTION:  Okay.  Well, could you find out, Morgan, or could you from your bureau people whether there is any response to the bill that just passed the House?

MS ORTAGUS:  To the House?

QUESTION:  Yeah.

MS ORTAGUS:  Probably not.

QUESTION:  The House of Representatives.

MS ORTAGUS:  Yeah.  Yeah, thank you.  I figured that.

QUESTION:  Well, thanks.

MS ORTAGUS:  Okay.  Happy holidays, everybody.

Links:

OFAC Notice

State Department Press Release

State Department Briefing

December 9, 2019: Global Magnitsky changes + 2 new Venezuela designations

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The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued Global Magnitsky General License Number 1Authorizing Certain Activities Necessary to the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Ventspils Freeport Authority, Ventspils Attistibas Agentura, Biznesa Attistibas Asociacija, and Latvijas Tranzita Biznesa Asociacija.

Additionally, the following persons:

ANDRIC, Goran, Serbia; DOB 21 Apr 1965; nationality Serbia; alt. nationality Bosnia and Herzegovina; citizen Serbia; alt. citizen United Kingdom; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

BRKIC, Nikola, Serbia; DOB 13 Jan 1954; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

CHANDY, King (a.k.a. CHAN DY, King; a.k.a. CHANDY, Keung; a.k.a. CHANDY, Koeung), Cambodia; DOB 01 Mar 1959; alt. DOB 01 Mar 1958; Gender Female (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: KIM, Kun).

CVJETKOVIC, Sreten, Serbia; DOB 15 Jan 1961; nationality Serbia; Gender Male; National ID No. 006789921 (Serbia) expires 25 May 2025 (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

KAPIDZIC, Esad (a.k.a. KAPIDZIC, Eso), Serbia; DOB 23 Jun 1959; alt. DOB 23 Jun 1958; POB Prijepolje, Montenegro; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

KIM, Kun, Cambodia; DOB 01 Jan 1954; POB Chan Toung Village, Sralap Commune, Tbaung Khmum District, Cambodia; Gender Male; Passport N0000259216 (Cambodia) expires 10 Jun 2025; alt. Passport D0002907 (Cambodia) (individual) [GLOMAG].

LEMBERGS, Aivars, Ventspils, Latvia; DOB 26 Sep 1953; POB Jekabpils, Latvia; nationality Latvia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

MARICIC, Ljubo, Serbia; DOB 10 Jan 1959; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

PETROVIC, Zelimir, Serbia; DOB 01 Sep 1981; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

PETROVIC, Zoran, Serbia; DOB 25 Apr 1969; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

PHARA, Kim, 135, St. 110 SR., Takhmao, Kandal, Cambodia; DOB 10 Sep 1984; POB Cambodia; Gender Male; Passport N0263817 (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: KIM, Kun).

PHEAP, Try (a.k.a. PHEAP, Thy), N10AB Street 271 SK. Toek Laork III, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; DOB 15 Jul 1965; POB Kandal Province, Cambodia; Gender Male; Passport N0239194 (Cambodia) expires 21 Feb 2008 (individual) [GLOMAG].

SARENAC, Nebojsa, Serbia; DOB 25 Dec 1977; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

SOPHARY, Kim, 135, Street 110, Takhmao, Kandal 0811, Cambodia; DOB 12 Dec 1982; POB Kampong Cham, Cambodia; Gender Female; Passport N00013860 (Cambodia) expires 13 Aug 2024 (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: KIM, Kun).

SUBOTIC, Milan, Serbia; DOB 08 Nov 1981; nationality Serbia; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

and entities:

7 MAKARA PHARY CO., LTD., Deaum Mien, Daeum Mien, Ta Khmau, Kandal 8252, Cambodia; Company Number 00037307 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: SOPHARY, Kim). 

ARANEKS DOO (a.k.a. ARANEKS DOO BEOGRAD-VOZDOVAC), Bulevar Oslobodenja 166, Belgrade 11010, Serbia; Tax ID No. 110965174 (Serbia); Registration Number 21407429 (Serbia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

BIZNESA ATTISTIBAS ASOCIACIJA (a.k.a. “BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION”), 8 – 1 Uzavas iela, Ventspils LV-3601, Latvia; Tax ID No. 40008055717 (Latvia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: LEMBERGS, Aivars).

BUSINESS DIVERSITY LIMITED (a.k.a. BUSINESS DIVERSITY LTD), Unit 11/F, CNT Tower, 338 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong; Registration Number 2421075 (Hong Kong) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

CAMBO ELITE SECURITY FORCE CO., LTD., Thmei, Ta Khmau, Ta Khmau, Kandal 8251, Cambodia; Company Number 00038610 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: SOPHARY, Kim).

FALCON STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS DOO (a.k.a. FALCON STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS DOO BEOGRAD-PALILULA), Todora Manojlovica 28, Belgrade 11060, Serbia; Tax ID No. 110427636 (Serbia); Registration Number 21348953 (Serbia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

FINROST LIMITED, Eleniko Building, Floor 4, Fla, 7 Stasandrou, Nicosia 1060, Cyprus; Registration Number HE 357180 (Cyprus) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

K D RUBBER PLANTATION CO., LTD., 135, 110, Thmei, Ta Khmau, Ta Khmau, Kandal 8251, Cambodia; Company Number 00023622 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: CHANDY, King).

LATVIJAS TRANZITA BIZNESA ASOCIACIJA (a.k.a. LATVIAN TRANSIT BUSINESS ASSOCIATION; a.k.a. TRANSIT BUSINESS ASSOCIATION OF LATVIA), 66 Dzintaru iela, Ventspils LV-3602, Latvia; Tax ID No. 40008008110 (Latvia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: LEMBERGS, Aivars).

M D S THMORDA S E Z CO., LTD. (a.k.a. MDS THMORDA SEZ), 10 AB, 271, Tuek L’ak Bei, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00019416(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

M. D. S. IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD. (a.k.a. MDS IMPORT EXPORT; a.k.a. MDS IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD.), 10 AB, Tuek L’ak Bei, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. K005-105000833 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019488(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

MELVALE CORPORATION DOO BEOGRAD (a.k.a. PREDUZECE ZA PROIZVODNJU, PROMET I USLUGE MELVALE CORPORATION DOO, BEOGRAD STARI GRAD), Tadeusa Koscuska 56, Belgrade 11000, Serbia; Tax ID No. 104150191 (Serbia); Registration Number 20100575 (Serbia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: SARENAC, Nebojsa).

MOONSTORM ENTERPRISES LIMITED, Elli Court, Flat No. 4, Floor No. 2, Arch. Makariou III 210, Limassol 3030, Cyprus; Registration Number HE247830 (Cyprus) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

PAPA PETROLEUM CO., LTD., 35, Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. L001-901503571 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019413 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

ROMDOUL CAPITAL PAWN CO., LTD., 21, 352 Boeng Keng Kang Muoy, Chamkar Mon, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00005573 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHARA, Kim).

ROMDOUL DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD., Boeng Keng Kang Moy, Chamkar Mon, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00024848 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHARA, Kim).

TARDIGRADE LIMITED, Dimitriados 1, Limassol 4004, Cyprus; Registration Number C378737 (Cyprus) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

TRY PHEAP DRY PORT CO., LTD., 35, 41 110 Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. K003-100194060 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019406(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (a.k.a. TRY PHEAP ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD.), 3-5 Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. L0001-901504050 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019414 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP GRAND ROYAL CAMBODIA CO., LTD., Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00014853 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP GROUP CO., LTD., 3, Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00019408 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD., 3 Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. K003-100075533 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019401(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP OYADAV S E Z CO., LTD. (a.k.a. TRY PHEAP OU YA DAV), 1 A, 271, Tuek L’ak Bei, Tuol Kouk, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Company Number 00019411(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP PROPERTY CO., LTD., 03 Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. K003-901637752 (Cambodia); Company Number 00013378(Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

TRY PHEAP TRAVEL & TOURS CO., LTD. (a.k.a. TRY PHEAP TRAVEL AND TOURS CO., LTD.), 3, Voat Phnum, Doun Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tax ID No. K003-104019131 (Cambodia); Company Number 00019403 (Cambodia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: PHEAP, Try).

VECTURA TRANS DOO (a.k.a. VECTURA TRANS DOO NOVI BEOGRAD), Narodnih Heroja 16, Belgrade, Serbia; Tax ID No. 109894091 (Serbia); Registration Number 21262358 (Serbia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

VELCOM TRADE DOO BEOGRAD (a.k.a. VELCOM TRADE PREDUZECE ZA PROIZVODNJU PROMET I USLUGE DOO, BEOGRAD STARI GRAD), Tadeusa Koscuskog 56, Belgrade 11000, Serbia; Tax ID No. 102858071 (Serbia); Registration Number 17499858 (Serbia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: ANDRIC, Goran).

VENTSPILS ATTISTIBAS AGENTURA (a.k.a. VENTSPILS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY; a.k.a. VENTSPILS DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION), Inzenieru 101A, Ventspils 3601, Latvia; Tax ID No. 40008033300 (Latvia) [GLOMAG] (Linked To: LEMBERGS, Aivars).

VENTSPILS FREEPORT AUTHORITY (a.k.a. FREEPORT OF VENTSPILS; a.k.a. FREEPORT OF VENTSPILS AUTHORITY; a.k.a. VENTSPILS FREE PORT; a.k.a. VENTSPILS FREEPORT), Jana 19, Ventspils LV-3601, Latvia [GLOMAG] (Linked To: LEMBERGS, Aivars).

were added to the SDN List under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. Additionally, an existing designation was updated:

TECHNOGLOBAL SYSTEMS DOO BEOGRAD (a.k.a. CALIDUS TRADE DOO; a.k.a. CALIDUS TRADE DOO BEOGRAD), Maglajska 19 11000, Beograd 6, Beograd, Serbia; Registration ID 20295066 (Serbia); Tax ID No. 105012258 [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan). -to- TEHNOGLOBAL SYSTEMS DOO BEOGRAD (a.k.a. CALIDUS TRADE DOO; a.k.a. CALIDUS TRADE DOO BEOGRAD), Maglajska 19 11000, Beograd 6, Beograd, Serbia; Registration ID 20295066 (Serbia); Tax ID No. 105012258 [GLOMAG] (Linked To: TESIC, Slobodan).

As of when I wrote this up, there was no press release about these designations. However, based on the number of parties, and the fact that there are a lot of commercial entities involved, my guess is that these are corruption-based, not due to human rights abuses (Global Magnitsky covers both).

Lastly, two people were also added to the Venezuela sanctions program:

VIZCAINO GIL, Gustavo Adolfo, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 03 May 1966; Gender Male; Cedula No. 6297704 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA].

DUGARTE PADRON, Juan Carlos, Caracas, Capital District, Venezuela; DOB 16 Oct 1955; Gender Male; Cedula No. 4353212 (Venezuela) (individual) [VENEZUELA].

The State Department issued a press release about the Venezuela designations:

On December 9, 2019, the United States sanctioned two officials aligned with the former Maduro regime pursuant to Executive Order 13692, as amended, which authorizes the designation of any person determined to be a current or former official of the Government of Venezuela.  Gustavo Adolfo Vizcaino Gil and Juan Carlos Dugarte Padron used their position as Director General of the Government of Venezuela’s Administrative Service of Identification, Migration, and Immigration (SAIME) to corruptly enrich themselves at the expense of Venezuelans seeking passport services.  Vizcaino was Director General from April 2016 until June 2018, when Dugarte replaced him.

During Vizcaino’s tenure, SAIME charged exorbitant fees from passport applicants, from which he personally profited.  Some passports were sold to non-Venezuelan citizens and other applicants never received passports, even after illicitly being charged thousands of dollars.  Dugarte also received kickbacks and was publicly implicated in corrupt dealings for the sale of passports.

It is unconscionable that Venezuelans may be unable to obtain a passport or have to pay excessive fees due to corruption, as they continue to flee the devastating conditions in Venezuela that Maduro and his corrupt associates have created.  This is yet another cause of the misery that millions of Venezuelans now suffer.

With our democratic partners in the region and around the world, the United States will continue to support the people of Venezuela, interim President Guaido, and the National Assembly.

So, here’s the question: what’s the upside of sanctioning Vizcaino, who is now a former official? How could he ever be removed, absent the program’s termination? How does a punitive designation, with no achievable result to satisfy US interests, advance US foreign policy, much less international security and stability? As a deterrent?

Links:

OFAC Notice

Global Magnitsky General License 1

State Department Press Release

Charity starts at home, huh?

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Today, on International Anticorruption Day, we reaffirm our commitment to prevent and combat corruption globally.  Corruption obstructs economic growth and development, facilitates transnational crime, and fuels terrorism, robbing citizens around the world of their basic rights.  Corruption enables and sustains autocratic leaders, weakens faith in democratic systems, creates opportunities for predatory actors to take advantage of our partners. It also creates political crises and governance challenges that endanger our national security.

The United States, through a number of agencies, including the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, takes a comprehensive approach to fighting corruption.  We work to hold the corrupt accountable through robust diplomatic engagement, by supporting multi-stakeholder initiatives and civil society, through foreign assistance to build stronger partners and transparent, trustworthy institutions, and by levying targeted sanctions and visa restrictions.  We can only tackle corruption effectively with a strategy that includes these many tools and has buy-in from all stakeholders.

In 2019, the State Department publicly designated almost 40 public officials and their immediate family members due to their involvement in significant corruption, pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019.  We will continue to use this authority globally to prevent corrupt officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members from traveling to and spending their ill-gotten gains in the United States.

On this day, we renew our call to all countries to address the scourge of corruption; effectively implement their international anticorruption commitments, including those under the UN Convention against Corruption; support civil society and journalists; and take measures to promote open and accountable governance.

Oh, the sweet irony of it all…

Link:

State Department Press Release

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